Power Politics and Precarious Positions: Indigenous narratives about intertribal power dynamics and competition in the tourism economy of Petra, Jordan

Nicolas Seth Reeves [*] and Abdel Hakim Al Husban [**]

Received on: 23/01/2023 DOI:https://doi.org /10.47017/32.3.12 Accepted on: 12/07/2023

Abstract

Aim of the study: For four decades, Petra has constituted the focal point of efforts by the Jordanian state to transform the Hashemite Kingdom's tourism sector into the country's economic engine. This study aims to examine the impact of government development efforts on power relations between the Bidūl and Layāthnā, two tribal groups indigenous to the Petra region whose lives and livelihoods have been transformed by increases in tourism to the city since the 1980s.

Methodology: The study uses positioning theory to analyze 56 semi-structured interviews with Bidūl and Layāthnā tribespeople conducted over four fieldwork visits to the Petra region from August 2018 to January 2020.

Findings and conclusions: The study finds that the Jordanian government's 1984 decision to remove the Bidūl from Petra's caves and resettle the tribe in Umm Sayhoun has had far-reaching ramifications for the balance of power between the Bidūl and the Layāthnā. In the present day, the Bidūl, Layāthnā, and Petra Development and Tourism Region Authority instrumentalize the move to Umm Sayhoun in speech acts questioning the Bidūl's self-ascribed right to work in the local tourism economy as equal citizens of the Petra region.

Keywords: Positioning Theory, Power; Tourism, Development,Government policy, Petra

1. Introduction

In November 2019, a normal day at the start of the winter tourism season suddenly became a scene of jubilant festivities as tourists, government officials, and residents of Petra, Jordan, celebrated the arrival of Alison Carey, the millionth person to visit the city that year. By year's end, this number had risen to 1.14 million, a record for Petra, whose ancient Nabataean ruins serve today as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan's most popular tourist destination.



Fig.1: Map of Jordan depicting Petra and the country's capital city, Amman. Map created by Emily Zhang. Used with permission.

[*] Paris School of International Affairs, Sciences Po, Paris, France.

[**] Department of Anthropology, Yarmouk University, Irbid, Jordan.

On a macro level, surpassing the million-visitor milestone in 2019 vindicated the idea that "in the Middle East, tourism gets sick but does not die," a phrase often repeated by Petra Development and Tourism Region Authority (PDTRA) officials and the city's indigenous *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribespeople, 80% of whom make a living through work in Petra's tourism sector (Kraishan, 2021). After regional political instability stoked by the 2011-2013 Arab Uprisings brought about six straight years of depressed tourism demand, the record-breaking numbers of 2019 represented the zenith of three successive years of increases in tourist arrivals, both in Petra and across Jordan (Petra Development & Tourism Region Authority, n.d.; Trading Economics, 2021a). Economically, these gains manifested in the national tourism industry's 19.8% contribution to Jordan's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019, a five-year high (Knoema, n.d.). This bust-to-boom cycle repeated itself following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. After lockdowns and concerns over infection slashed visitor numbers to less than 25% of their 2019 level in 2020 and 2021, arrivals to Petra rebounded to 80% of their pre-pandemic high in 2022 (Jordan Times, 2023). Having welcomed 324,350 tourists in the first three months of 2023 alone (Mustafa, 2023), Petra looks likely to soon break the million-visitor mark once again.



Fig.2: Annual number of visitors to Petra, 1984-2023. Data for the years 1986-1991 is missing. Data obtained from Petra Development & Tourism Region Authority (n.d.), Jordan Times (2023), and Mustafa (2023).

Despite the sector's vulnerability to regional instability, pandemics, and other external shocks, tourism development has emerged over the past four decades as a key pillar of the Hashemite Kingdom's economic growth strategy. As the country's most recognizable tourist destination, the Jordanian state's efforts in this regard have long centered on Petra. Starting with King Hussein's successful drive to secure UNESCO recognition of Petra as a World Heritage Site in 1985, the promotion of the ancient Nabataean Empire's capital city on the international stage has brought the region and its inhabitants into increasing contact with visitors from abroad (See Figure 2). Over the past four decades, this encounter has had far-reaching consequences for indigenous communities in and around Petra Archaeological Park (PAP). The most visible of these is the socioeconomic shift in the region from livelihoods focused on semi-nomadic pastoralism and farming to work in the tourism industry. The indigenous groups most profoundly impacted by this transformation are the *Bidūl* tribe of Umm Sayhoun and members of the *Layāthnā* tribal confederation living in Wadi Musa. Because these towns border Petra (See Figure 3), expanding tourism flows created an opportunity for their residents to make a living as entrepreneurs or workers in the souvenir and hospitality industry. As a result, many *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribespeople participate in Petra's tourism economy as souvenir sellers or renters of donkey, horse, or camel rides within PAP, or as owners or employees of restaurants and hotels in Wadi Musa.



Fig.3: Map depicting major towns and archaeological sites in the Petra region. Map created by Emily Zhang. Used with permission.

To regulate Petra's expanding tourism flows and booming tourism economy, Jordanian authorities have strengthened the administrative link connecting the city and its surrounding communities with the institutions of the central government in Amman. As a result, the Petra region—a rural backwater during Ottoman times and the first four decades of Hashemite rule over Jordan (Reeves, 2020)—became the target of successive management plans, each of which sought to strike a balance between protecting the ancient Nabataean capital's archaeological treasures and developing PAP for tourism (Reeves, 2023, 3). Rarely, however, did members of Petra's indigenous communities receive the opportunity to substantively participate in the articulation of these plans (Akrawi, 2012, 49). Though the latest management plan for the Petra region featured unprecedented community engagement in the design process (Orbasli and Cesaro, 2020, 98-103), this one-off participation opportunity juxtaposes the top-down structure and decision-making processes of the Petra Development and Tourism Region Authority (PDTRA), the institution that governs the Petra region. Founded in 2009, the PDTRA is run by a Board of Commissioners, each of whom are chosen by Jordan's royally-appointed prime minister (Akrawi, 2012, 48). On paper, then, accountability flows directly from PDTRA policymakers to the prime minister's office in Amman, while no such relationship links them to their constituents in the Petra region.

Seen from the perspective of the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā*, the Petra region has undergone fundamental transformations in the span of just over one generation. From tourism-related economic opportunities to new government institutions, these changes constitute powerful impulses originating from outside the Petra region that have the potential to influence political hierarchies and power dynamics within it. This paper sheds light on these effects through answering the following research question: how have governmental development policies impacted power relations among Petra's indigenous communities?

To answer this question, we interviewed 56 *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribespeople over four visits to the Petra region between August 2018 and January 2020. Through positioning theory analysis, we analyze narratives propagated by *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* study participants concerning development policies that have targeted these indigenous groups over the past 40 years. We find that the decision in the 1980s to remove the *Bidūl* from Petra's caves and resettle the tribe in Umm Sayhoun constitutes a seminal event that has lodged itself in the collective memory of both the *Bidūl* and the *Layāthnā*. This event consequently occupies a salient position in narratives that entrepreneurs from Umm Sayhoun and Wadi Musa, along with PDTRA decision-makers, propagate to explain present-day inequalities between the *Bidūl* and the *Layāthnā*, and to justify statements ascribing rights and duties within

Petra's tourism economy to each of these stakeholder groups. These discursively ascribed rights and duties, combined with the present-day policies they underpin, constrain the agency of the *Bidūl* to negotiate dominant narratives portraying the participation of entrepreneurs from the tribe in Petra's tourism sector as illegitimate and unlawful.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of positioning theory, its relevance to the study of intergroup power dynamics, and the suitability of its empirical application to the case of Petra. In Section 3, we describe the interview methodology we employed during fieldwork visits to the Petra region between August 2018 and January 2020. Section 4 discusses salient storylines contained in these interviews that relate to government development policies and their effect on power dynamics between Petra's local communities. Section 5 concludes.

2. Theoretical background

Positioning theory provides analytical tools for examining the negotiation of power relations through discourse. Belonging to the analytical family of Foucauldian discourse analysis and sharing the logic of Bourdieu's (1977) conceptualization of social interactions as the exchange of challenges and ripostes, positioning theory focuses on speech acts that ascribe individuals or groups with certain arrays of rights and duties. Examining these interactions in the context of the larger narratives that furnish them with meaning allows for (im)balances of power between participants in these discursive confrontations to become apparent. In this section, we sketch the vocabulary of positioning theory and use empirical examples from the literature to illustrate its relevance to the study of intergroup conflict and power dynamics.



Fig.4: The Speech Act-Position-Storyline triad.
Reproduced from Harré and van Langenhove (1999, 18).

2.1 Positioning theory: Basic concepts

The building blocks of positioning theory come directly from Foucauldian discourse analysis. Positioning theorists Rom Harré and Luk van Langenhove (1999) argued that any intentional verbal articulation can be located as a *speech act* uttered by a person occupying a certain *position* among participants in a given discursive context. Speech acts ascribe positions—arrays of rights, duties, and obligations that limit the cluster of legitimate actions a person can take—to the speaker and subjects of a conversation (Greiff, 2018, 66). To borrow Bourdieu's language, interlocutors then either accept this positioning or attempt to resist it by countering it with a riposte. The success of such a challenge depends on the balance of power between the source and target of the speech act. Speech acts are thus analogues to Michel Foucault's (1972) *statements*, which he defines in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* as communicators of verbal signs (82-83), the significance of which is negotiated as participants in a discourse repeat them and gradually agree on their meaning.

For Foucault, statements become intelligible against the backdrop of the *archive*, which he describes as the repository of past statements that participants determine are still relevant to a particular discourse. To further the knowledge production process, new statements interact with

archived statements by confirming them, modifying them, or invalidating them (Foucault, 1972, 82-87, 99). Similarly, positioning theory holds that speech acts generate meaning against the background of a *storyline*, which allows these verbal articulations to become relatively determinate within a given discursive context (Harré and van Langenhove, 1999, 16). Like Foucault's conceptualization of the statement's relationship with the archive, storylines evolve over time as speech acts are added, modified, or removed from them, and as the positions of actors within these overarching narratives change vis-à-vis one another.

2.2 Positioning theory, conflict, and intergroup power dynamics

Positioning theory represents a novel approach to studying conflict because it approaches this phenomenon as a discursive element of the larger process of intergroup power relations. Positioning theory analysis thus portrays how the dynamics of group histories and storylines inform disputes (Tan & Moghaddam, 1999, 186–187). In conflict situations, positioning theory's focus on narratives enables the identification of harmful storylines that could trigger violence if left unaddressed (Greiff, 2018, 70). The concept of forced and frozen positions is particularly relevant in this regard. An individual occupies a forced position when a speech act propagated by another interlocutor coerces him/her into a position that differs from his/her chosen position. A frozen position, meanwhile, describes the situation where a speech act compels an individual to adopt a cluster of rights, duties, and obligations that prevent him/her from renegotiating his/her positioning within the agreed-upon rules of the discourse (Greiff, 2018, 69). While violence exposes the existence of frozen positions in conflicts *ex post*, positioning theory analysis can help mitigate this outcome by revealing losses of agency among individuals and groups before disputes escalate.

The examination of pre-positioning and group memory plays a crucial role in identifying situations where forced and frozen positioning could occur. In his exploration of time and context in positioning theory, Bartlett (2008) revealed that certain memories stand out more than others in the development of storylines that impact group positioning processes in conflict situations. In Guyana, for instance, the Amerindian Act of 1976, which established centralized control over the country's indigenous Amerindians, created an inflection point in this group's history against which all subsequent events have been interpreted. Beyond its omnipresence in the daily lives of Amerindians, the Act, along with texts written in response to it, like the 2001 Constitution of the North Rupununi District Development Board, constitutes a portion of the national-level storyline that describes negotiations between government parties and Amerindians over their status (Bartlett, 2008, 172).

Similarly, Shryock's (1997) study of the oral histories of the *ʿAdwan* and *ʿAbbad* tribes of Jordan's Balga region revealed the role that shared memories play in informing power relations between the two groups today. Though the *ʿAdwan* and *ʿAbbad* no longer resort to the sword to settle questions of tribal superiority over the Balga, Shryock's *ʿAdwani* and *ʿAbbadi* informants nonetheless justified their claims about present intertribal power dynamics by narrating stories that detailed their ancestors' heroic conduct in tribal wars and episodes of resistance against Ottoman rule before the Hashemites came to power in 1921 (Shryock, 1997, 174-190). For the *ʿAdwan*, the *ʿAbbad*, and the Amerindians of Guyana, important events of the past thus transcend the constraints of the space and the time in which they occurred by lodging themselves in the memory of group members, enabling their continued impact on positioning acts in the present.

2.3 Pre-positioning in Petra

Much in the way that Bartlett and Shryock observed the continued impact of seminal speech acts on conflicts in Guyana and Jordan's Balga region, the importance of past governmental and tribal positionings in Petra manifests in their prominence in storylines propagated by *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribespeople today. Recent scholarship undertaken by Reeves (2022a) highlights the importance of narratives recalling the role of local tribes in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916-1918 in legitimating these groups' claims to Petra today. In particular, members of the *Layāthnā* tribal confederation narrate stories positioning their forefathers as leaders in the armed struggle to push the Ottomans out of Wadi Musa and surrounding areas so that "they could not occupy Petra" (Reeves, 2022a, 15). In this

Layāthnā storyline, Prince—later King—Abdullah I, Jordan's first Hashemite ruler, rewarded Wadi Musan bravery by "g[iving] Petra to the *Layāthnā*" (Reeves, 2021).

The multifaceted instrumentalization of this narrative in the present day is instructive in illustrating the flexible manner in which speech acts interact with storylines etched into group memories in order to serve contemporary agendas. For example, Reeves (2020) revealed that *Layāthnā* sheikhs emphasize that Abdullah I gave the title of "Guardian of the Archaeological Artifacts of Wadi Musa" only to Mu'amar bin Bashir al-Nawafla, the tribal confederation's paramount sheikh at the time. In contrast, tourism-sector entrepreneurs from Wadi Musa stress that Jordan's founding ruler handed over custodianship of Petra's ruins to all *Layāthnā* tribespeople, an argument that these individuals use to contest the *Bidūl*'s self-proclaimed right to reside in the city's vicinity and participate in its tourism economy (Reeves, 2022a, 18). The claim that Abdullah I bestowed upon the *Layāthnā* a special responsibility over Petra thus comes out of the archive to serve as discursive ammunition in two different present-day conflicts. The first centers around the waning authority and prestige of tribal sheikhs in contemporary times amidst the emergence of competing sources of economic and political authority in rural areas, particularly in tourism hubs like Petra (Reeves, 2020; Reeves, 2022a, 15-16). The second, meanwhile, concerns competition over tourism-sector revenues between *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* entrepreneurs. In the empirical portion of this paper, we build on scholarship examining the latter conflict to furnish additional insights into the discursive context of contemporary *Bidūl-Layāthnā* power relations, examining specifically the way that government development policies in the past and present have impacted this relationship.

3. Methodology and Sampling Strategy

In this study, we employed a participant-centered approach to explore how government development policies impact the discourse through which the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* position themselves, each other, and the PDTRA. To do so, we attempted to position ourselves as communicators of local narratives, recognizing that *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* interviewees, as active participants in Petra's moral order, were the true experts in our inquiry. In line with this self-positioning, we adopted a constructivist epistemology in evaluating the speech acts of our *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* interlocutors. Accordingly, our analysis assumes not only that study participants use language to convey their lived experiences, but that the speech acts they utter in interviews are part of larger storylines that play a role in creating the material manifestations of intergroup power dynamics in Petra today. We are thus less interested in determining the objective truth of salient storylines related to us than we are in understanding what they convey about local perspectives pertaining to *Bidūl-Layāthnā* relations today.

We recognize, however, that our above-mentioned self-positioning as unremarkable observers of *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* intergroup relations is impossible to maintain in practice. At the very least, this is due to the fact that any interview is itself a positioning interaction that features the same process of negotiation—via speech acts—that we attempted to observe among indigenous actors in Petra's tourism economy. To minimize our role as actors in Petra's discursive context, we adopted a semi-structured interview method. The following questions served as points from which study participants could take control of the conversation, allowing them to present the storylines of competition in Petra they wished to relate to us:

1. How does your life differ from that of your father and grandparents?
2. What is your tribe's history in Petra?
3. How has tourism impacted your life? How has this impact changed across generations?
4. Has tourism impacted your relationship with other governmental or tribal stakeholders?

In responding to these questions, *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* interviewees described past speech acts of ongoing significance to themselves, their tribe, and Petra's local community as a whole. In this way, study participants informed us of storylines that figure prominently in the formation of indigenous perspectives related to intergroup conflict over Petra's tourism revenues today. For instance, *Bidūl* interviewees tended to respond to Question 2 with stories describing everyday life in Petra's caves before the advent of tourism, contrasting the simplicity of mundane activities from this time, such as

gathering firewood, with the cost, complexity, and commotion of the tribe's tourism-focused lives and livelihoods in Umm Sayhoun.

Between August 2018 and January 2020, we conducted face-to-face interviews in Arabic with 28 *Bidūl* and 28 *Layāthnā* tribespeople.[1] Interviews with *Bidūl* tribespeople took place in Petra and Umm Sayhoun, while interviews with members of the *Layāthnā* took place in Petra and Wadi Musa. We coded the subjects as follows: Participants 1 through 28 are *Bidūl* interviewees, while Participants 29 through 56 are *Layāthnā* interviewees. We initially interviewed several *Bidūl* souvenir sellers and a *Layāthnā* taxi driver. We found additional interviewees through a snowball sampling method in which we asked participants to refer us to individuals who they thought could provide us with further information. After repeating this process several times, we found that new interviewees' positioning statements largely conformed to those heard in previous interviews, indicating that the data were saturated.

4. Discussion

By analyzing indigenous narratives pertaining to the conflict over Petra's tourism revenues, we uncovered the enduring impact of past government policies on the present-day balance of power between the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā*. In this section, we detail how these elements of the collective memory of both tribal groups recur in contemporary speech acts that attempt to force certain members of Petra's indigenous communities into agency-constraining positions. We trace how the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* react to these instances of forced positioning and identify situations that might produce frozen positions for certain indigenous groups in the future.

4.1. Storyline: Shortcomings of government intervention and the move to Umm Sayhoun

Tension between the *Bidūl*, the *Layāthnā*, and government authorities constitutes a longstanding feature of Petra's moral order. Before the 1995 creation of the PDTRA's predecessor, the Petra Regional Planning Council, administratively linked the state and its economic-growth plans to Petra's tribal communities, direct interventions by the central government represented the primary method for implementing Amman's tourism-development agenda at the local level (Bille, 2019). The most impactful of these policies, the *Bidūl's* 1984 relocation from their homes in Petra's caves to Umm Sayhoun, remains lodged in the collective memory of Petra's indigenous communities and consequently occupies a prominent place in storylines propagated by the *Bidūl,* the *Layāthnā,* and the PDTRA today. This sub-section describes the move and highlights its contemporary significance through examining the contexts in which *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* interviewees refer to it in speech acts concerning intergroup relations in the present day.

4.1.1. The buildup to the move

King Hussein's decision to move the *Bidūl* from Petra's caves to the village of Umm Sayhoun came in response to national-level political and economic changes that occurred in the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Following the conflict, Israel occupied the West Bank, territory Jordan had claimed after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Losing the West Bank was an economic blow for Jordan; tourism to Jerusalem alone contributed almost one third of the Kingdom's gross national product before 1967 (Pappé, 1994, 70). The loss of the West Bank also boosted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)'s stature in Jordan, as many Palestinian nationalists interpreted defeat in the war as evidence that they could not rely on the Hashemite monarchy to safeguard the Palestinian people's interests. As a result, the PLO became increasingly assertive, militant and hostile towards its Hashemite hosts, precipitating tensions which culminated in the 1970-1971 Jordanian Civil War between the organization and forces loyal to the royal family. Though the conflict, known as Black September, resulted in the expulsion of PLO leaders to Lebanon, the existential threat the civil war posed to Hashemite authority nonetheless influenced the regime to abandon its attempts to position itself as the unifier of the peoples of the river Jordan's West and East Banks. Instead, Black September precipitated the forging of a new, East-Bank-centric Jordanian identity (Massad, 2001, 72–74). Petra

and the Bedouin, a term that came to refer to all Jordanians of East Bank origins, regardless of their sedentary or nomadic heritage, became the primary symbols of this reinvented national image.[2]

While Petra emerged as a symbol of East-Bank-exclusivist conceptualizations of Jordanian national identity after Black September, government-led attempts to transform the city into an engine for national economic growth did not intensify until the 1980s. Following the instability of 1968–1971, the 1970s featured considerable growth as Jordan entered the orbit of the newly-established Arab oil economies (Anani, 1987, 125). Oil price increases caused many educated Jordanians to emigrate to work in the Gulf starting in 1973 (Tourk, 2001, 91–92). Rising oil prices also led imported goods to become more expensive, causing the cost of living in Jordan to increase by 20% in 1974 and 17% in 1975 (Anani, 1987, 130). Remittances sent by Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf also fueled a wave of real estate investment and heightened consumption spending, leading to further inflation. In the real estate market, demand for housing far outpaced supply, forcing the government to introduce controls to regulate prices and subsidies to boost production, causing government expenditures to reach 68% of Jordan's GDP in 1980 (Anani, 1987, 136).

As oil prices decreased in the early 1980s, the real estate speculation and foreign financial flows that fueled economic growth in the preceding decade fell. Despite this, popular pressure prevented the government from eliminating the subsidies of the 1970s. Employers in the Gulf, meanwhile, began laying off Jordanian workers in favor of cheaper labor from Southern Asia, further straining the government as it struggled to provide services and employment opportunities to returning expatriates (Tourk, 2001, 91). Moreover, aid from the Gulf, which rose to 1.2 billion dollars per year after the 1978 Baghdad Conference, fell substantially in 1983 due to oil price decreases (Anani, 1987, 137). As a result, the Jordanian government began searching for alternative ways to finance its skyrocketing fiscal expenditures. It was in this context that Jordan lobbied UNESCO to designate Petra as a World Heritage Site. UNESCO feared, however, that the *Bidūl's* presence in Petra's caves damaged the city's architecture. This prompted King Hussein to visit Petra in 1984 to negotiate the tribe's relocation to Umm Sayhoun in order to smooth the world heritage designation process, which was completed the next year and precipitated a 114% increase in tourism to the city between 1984 and 1985 (Petra Development & Tourism Region Authority, n.d.).

4.1.2 Bidūl positioning

Contrary to the above narrative, which positions King Hussein as the initiator of the plan to relocate the *Bidūl* to Umm Sayhoun, members of the tribe were careful to assert that the decision to leave the caves was theirs. Participant 23, a *Bidūl* sheikh, claimed that "the choice [to move to Umm Sayhoun] was the Bedouins'. It was not forced."[3] Participant 11, a souvenir seller, agreed,

The idea to bring the Bedouins to the village from the caves came originally from the Bedouins, not from the government. When he visited Petra, King Hussein asked the Bedouins, 'what can we do to help you?' The Bedouins said they wanted a village in order to achieve better access to government services.

In both statements, *Bidūl* interviewees positioned their fellow tribespeople as enjoying the agency to negotiate their exit from the caves and possessing the foresight to present a mutually-agreeable solution to the cash-strapped goverment, who needed UNESCO recognition of Petra to heighten the city's international profile and boost tourism revenues.

Bidūl study participants asserted that the tribe's leaders placed three conditions on their relocation. Participant 23 summarized,

The first condition was to have all of our interests in Petra preserved. The second condition was for us to have free water and electricity. The third condition was that each person in the tribe would receive a piece of land, [totalling] 60 square meters. For this reason, we were promised 1.5 kilometers of land originally.

According to the *Bidūl* storyline, the government did not fulfill these stipulations, even though King Hussein agreed to them. Participant 22, a souvenir seller, lamented, "In 1984, we were promised free water and electricity. This did not happen." Participant 11 added,

We do not have land. The government came in the 1980s and said that Umm Sayhoun should extend an additional 1.5 kilometers to the north. We never got that land. Now, over 6,000 people live on the 800-meter strip of land that is Umm Sayhoun.

According to Participant 23, the attractive arrangement between King Hussein and the *Bidūl* broke down when the government changed the deal without tribal leaders' knowledge:

The problem is that there were some sheikhs who signed the written agreement after receiving their land [in Umm Sayhoun] without thinking about other members of the tribe. The government goes by the written contract, not by what was verbally agreed to. The sheikhs just blindly trusted the written agreement, took some money, signed, and got their land; they believed in what the state was saying, and that was it.

Participant 21, a souvenir seller, made a similar assertion, saying that "the government promised one thing by mouth but wrote something else on paper, taking advantage of the fact that many people [in the *Bidūl*] were illiterate at the time." For the *Bidūl*, the move to Umm Sayhoun is thus a storyline of broken promises. The freedom the sheikhs allegedly enjoyed in negotiating a deal with King Hussein transformed into the tribe's present-day forced, agency-constraining position in overcrowded Umm Sayhoun due to alleged differences between the verbal deal and the written agreement.

4.1.3 Layāthnā positioning

Layāthnā positioning statements demonstrate the degree to which the *Bidūl's* relocation to Umm Sayhoun constrains the tribe's agency in Petra today. Even though the writings of travelers like Burkhardt (1822), as well as the ethnographic work of Russell (1993) and al-Mousa (2016), demonstrate convincingly that the *Bidūl* settled in Petra over 200 years ago, *Layāthnā* interviewees positioned the *Bidūl* as newcomers who settled on *Layāthnā* land and abused the tribe's hospitality. For instance, Participant 54, a sheikh, revealed, "The original inhabitants of this area are the *Layāthnā*. The *Bidūl* came here in the 1930s and after. The *Bidūl* came to escape poverty; life was hard for them where they are from." Participant 42, the *mukhtar* [headman] of the *Ḥamādīn*, a tribe belonging to the *Layāthnā* confederation, added, "We treated the *Bidūl* like neighbors when they came. We allowed them to live alongside us in the caves. Now, they claim to be Petra's original inhabitants so as to benefit from tourism themselves. They take the *Layāthnā's* work." The sheikh and the *mukhtār* positioned the *Bidūl* as guests who abuse the rights and neglect the responsibilities associated with this status. Specifically, Participants 42 and 54 position participation in the tourism economy as a privilege reserved exclusively for "Petra's original inhabitants." Adding insult to injury, these speech acts highlight that *Bidūl* work in the tourism industry not only exceeds the boundaries of the tribe's role as guests of the *Layāthnā*, but moreover constitutes an ungrateful rejection of the hospitality Wadi Musans displayed in allegedly treating the *Bidūl* "like neighbors."

Though this positioning of the *Bidūl* as ungrateful outsiders contradicts the writings of Burkhardt (1822) and other travelers who visited Petra in the 19th century, the tribe's relocation to Umm Sayhoun established facts on the ground that lend credence to these *Layāthnā* speech acts. This is because the territory upon which the government built Umm Sayhoun forms part of the *Layāthnā*'s ancestral lands. Participant 50, a *qānūnī* souvenir seller, explained,

The land that the government bought for Umm Sayhoun belonged to the *Ḥasanāt* [a tribe belonging to the *Layāthnā* confederation]. Because of this, until now, there are tensions between the *Layāthnā* and the *Bidūl*; the presence of the *Bidūl* in Petra is not permitted, lawful, or legitimate since the *Bidūl* are not the original inhabitants of Petra.

Participant 54, the sheikh, struck a similar tone, saying, "The government took the land from the *Nawāfla* [another *Layāthnā* tribe] and the *Ḥasanāt* without warning or asking. Now, the *Bidūl* live on land that belongs rightfully to the *Nawāfla* and the *Ḥasanāt*." In linking intertribal tensions to the government's acquisition of *Layāthnā* land to build Umm Sayhoun, Participant 50 positioned this decision to erect a permanent home for the *Bidūl* in Petra as a threat to the host-guest relationship that, according to the *Layāthnā*, constitutes the proper power dynamic between the two tribes.

It is worthwhile here to reiterate what makes these speech acts possible. In relocating the *Bidūl* to Umm Sayhoun, government authorities separated the tribe from their ancestral lands within PAP. Furthermore, the village's location on lands claimed by the *Nawāfla* and the *Ḥasanāt* made this uprooting doubly consequential. As a result, the positioning of the *Bidūl* as a people without history in the Petra region gains credence by virtue of realities on the ground in the present day. Materially, the *Bidūl* possess little with which to resist this forced positioning, since the land of their ancestors is not recognized in the present day as theirs: after all, Petra Archaeological Park belongs to the state.

4.2 Storyline: Present-day intergroup inequality

Do the consequences of the *Bidūl*'s forced positioning as guests in Petra transcend beyond the discursive realm, manifesting in material consequences for the tribe? To answer this question, we examine speech acts articulated by members of the *Bidūl*, the *Layāthnā*, and PDTRA officials that ascribe rights and duties to the regional government and local groups. To the extent that these ascribed roles constitute forced positions, we explore, in a second step, the strategies that stakeholders positioned as such employ to counter these speech acts.

4.2.1 Legal and illegal employment

As Participant 23 recounted in his summary of the conditions subject to which the *Bidūl* left Petra's caves in order to resettle in Umm Sayhoun, the tribe stipulated first and foremost that "all of our interests in Petra [be] preserved." Forty years later, the fact that most *Bidūl* tribespeople who work in PAP do so illegally reveals that the tribe's precarious existence in the Petra region extends beyond its settlement of land claimed by rival groups from Wadi Musa (Reeves, 2023, 5). Within our sample, study participants' conscious distinction between *shughl mukhālaf* [illegal work] and *shughl qānūnī* [legal work] points to the discursive significance of the *Bidūl*'s largely unlawful involvement in Petra's tourism economy. Specifically, this differentiation occurred in *Layāthnā* speech acts that contrasted the tribe's self-described lawful economic presence in Petra with unlawful *Bidūl* business ventures in the city. For instance, Participant 52, a *qānūnī* souvenir seller whose shop is located near Petra's visitor center in Wadi Musa, said, "These shops, we built them using our own, personal funds. After we built them, the authorities said, 'You must pay rent.' This rent is not symbolic; we pay 6,000 Jordanian Dinars [8,500 U.S. Dollars] per year for these shops." Referring to the *Bidūl,* Participant 53, his business partner, stated, "Those people are governed by a different God; not one of them pays a single cent. There are no more than five permitted shops in Petra. There are 200 *mukhālaf* shops."

The *Bidūl* mentioned the *qānūnī-mukhālaf* distinction in challenging these *Layāthnā* positioning acts, arguing that the dichotomy is illegitimate because local authorities do not give the *Bidūl* opportunities to engage in *shughl qānūnī*. Participant 15, a *mukhālaf* souvenir seller, stated,

I have been working here for 23 years. For 23 years, I have worked in Petra, from the time I was seven years old. Now, I am 31 years old, and I am still working in Petra, and have still not received a permit…If the government was good to us, it would establish cooperatives for us [so that we could work legally].

Like other *Bidūl* entrepreneurs, Participant 15 used the amount of time she has worked in Petra as evidence that the government, not her unwillingness to follow the rules, constitutes the main reason for her continued *mukhālaf* activity in Petra.

4.2.2 Expectations of the PDTRA

Work in the tourism sector, whether *qānūnī* or *mukhālaf*, colors *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* study participants' speech acts that ascribe duties to the PDTRA and evaluate the extent to which the institution fulfills these responsibilities. While expectations placed on the PDTRA differ between the two tribal groups, speech acts propagated by members of both indicate a dissatisfaction with the institution, which interviewees position as falling short of its duties. Participant 12, an illegal souvenir seller from Umm Sayhoun, stated, "The government does not help with the *Bidūl's* financial struggles." Participant 13, another illegal souvenir seller, added that "the government comes in and destroys the shops that are non-permitted. Clearly, they do not want the shops in Petra." Participant 21, also a *mukhālaf* souvenir seller, asked, "The government created a center for young people in Wadi Musa. Why did they not create one in Umm Sayhoun? Why do they discriminate against the *Bidūl*?" Participant 21 positioned the PDTRA as neglecting a duty to provide equal services to the citizens of Wadi Musa and Umm Sayhoun. Meanwhile, Participants 12 and 13 positioned the PDTRA as more than simply negligent in this regard: they accused the local government of destroying *mukhālaf* souvenir sellers' livelihoods.

Meanwhile, the dissatisfaction of *Layāthnā* tribespeople with the PDTRA stems from their perception that the institution does not crack down on illegal entrepreneurial activity enough. Participant 52, a legal souvenir seller, stated,

The PDTRA knows which shops are permitted and which are not, so the state helps out with the creation of the injustice and chaos that is present in Petra. It's like there are two regimes: one governs the *Bidūl* and the other governs the *Layāthnā*.

Participant 54, also a *qānūnī* souvenir seller, added, "The presence of donkeys, camels, and horses in Petra is really bad for Petra and is destroying it. The only people who should be allowed to go to Petra are those who are officially permitted to work there." Like Participant 21, Participants 52 and 54 tasked the PDTRA with treating all groups within the local community equally. They, however, asserted that inequality in Petra arises because the PDTRA favors the *Bidūl*, who are allowed to continue their *mukhālaf* business activity without consequence. Competing *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* notions of equality, epitomized by the groups' contradictory positioning of the PDTRA's duties regarding unlawful economic activity in Petra, demonstrate that the current status quo in Petra's tourism economy constitutes an unstable equilibrium. On the one hand, the predominantly *qānūnī Layāthnā* entrepreneurs desire for *mukhālaf* sellers to be forbidden from entering Petra, while on the other, unlicensed workers from the *Bidūl* call for the distribution of more permits.

4.2.3 PDTRA speech acts: Forced positioning and Bidūl ripostes

With respect to PDTRA speech acts concerning indigenous work in Petra's tourism economy, the storyline of the *Bidūl*'s relocation to Umm Sayhoun once again comes to the fore. Participant 56, a *Layāthnā* tribesman who spoke in his official capacity as special advisor to the Deputy Chairman of the PDTRA's Board of Commissioners, positioned the move from the caves to the village as a direct cause of *mukhālaf* business activity in Petra. Like the *Layāthnā* entrepreneurs, the special advisor indicated that the solution to this problem is less *Bidūl* work, not more permits. He stated, "Sadly, Umm Sayhoun was built too close to Petra. It should have been built further away from Petra to allow the people to separate themselves from Petra" He added,

The chaos is what is endangering Petra and is what will ruin tourism here. Do we want to preserve Petra, or do we want to destroy it? Increases in people and increases in children working will make Petra unsafe and unattractive and will endanger Petra's place as a world-renowned tourist destination.

For the PDTRA, the way to bring order to the chaos is to remove the *mukhālaf* sellers from Petra. In our interview, Participant 56 mentioned the PDTRA's intention to "create a heritage village outside of Petra" for the tribe's entrepreneurs. Now complete, he justified the idea for the heritage village by lamenting, "Nobody wears Bedouin clothes inside Petra. Maybe this will help them go back to

actually wearing Bedouin clothes." He observed that "if they [the *Bidūl*] wish to develop and leave the Bedouin lifestyle, that means that we have lost a part of Petra's identity."

Consistent with agency-constraining speech acts propagated by *Layāthnā* entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the *Bidūl*, Participant 56's statements underline that the PDTRA—through its rhetoric and tangible policies—deems only a limited range of *Bidūl* activities in the tourism economy to be legitimate. Geographically, these activities are limited to the 67-donum heritage village located on the road between Umm Sayhoun and Bayda, well away from the routes taken by the typical visitor to Petra and from the *Bidūl*'s ancestral land within PAP. Functionally, *Bidūl* tribesmen, most of whom now wear clothes identical to those of the European and American tourists to whom they sell souvenirs and donkey rides within PAP, are expected to wear "Bedouin clothes." Thus the *Bidūl*, as designated messengers of the past, would exist outside of time, on display for curious—mostly Western—tourists, the ambassadors of modernity. This positioning of the *Bidūl* echoes the British colonialist creation of the "eternal Arab," whose value lies in his utility as an object exhibited to European eyes (Massad, 2001, 136; Mitchell, 1991, xiii–xiv).

Bidūl entrepreneurs have resisted this forced positioning by the PDTRA. Members of the tribe have used their bodies to contest the restrictive rights and duties ascribed to them, doing so in a manner that belies their marginal economic and legal position in Petra's tourism economy. Specifically, *mukhālaf* entrepreneurs have refused to move to the stalls of the heritage village. At the time of this article's acceptance, *Bidūl* workers instead continue their daily routine of commuting from Umm Sayhoun to their places of business within PAP, rendering the heritage village a ghost town (See Figure 5). For the tribe, resisting the PDTRA's forced positioning means suffering periodic violence. In August 2022, for instance, armored vehicles belonging to the Jordanian gendarmerie descended upon Petra to "remove any non-permitted installations in the region" (Reeves, 2022b). In the confrontation that ensued, several *Bidūl* tribespeople breathed in tear gas launched by the gendarmes while children from the tribe pelted the vehicles with rocks. Though *Bidūl* entrepreneurs have succeeded in resisting efforts to force them into the restrictive role of ambassadors of Petra's past, the extreme means to which they have resorted in doing so reveal the frozen position these workers have come to occupy within the city's tourism economy.

Fig.5: Complete yet unused, the heritage village located on the road connecting Umm Sayhoun and Bayda stands empty. Photographs taken by the authors in June 2022.

5. Conclusion

In this study, we examined how development policies have impacted power relations between the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribes of the Petra region. To do so, we interviewed 56 *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* tribespeople, using positioning theory to examine narratives they propagated about competition in the tourism industry and government policies in the past and present. Through this analysis, we revealed that the balance of power between the *Bidūl* and *Layāthnā* is lopsided, and that the roots of this disparity can be found, in part, in the government's 1984 decision to relocate the *Bidūl* from the caves of Petra to Umm Sayhoun. This seminal moment in Petra's recent history strengthens speech acts propagated by the PDTRA and *Layāthnā* entrepreneurs that limit the scope of legitimate *Bidūl* participation in Petra's tourism economy to a restrictive array of rights and duties that differs from the tribe's current, predominantly unlicensed business activities within PAP. Though the *Bidūl* counter the policies, like the construction of a heritage village, that accompany this forced positioning, the outbursts of violence connected to this resistance highlight the frozen position in which the tribe's entrepreneurs currently find themselves.

Bidūl refusal to submit to PDTRA and *Layāthnā* forced positioning of the tribe as second-class citizens of Petra—even when faced with government-sanctioned crackdowns—shows the lengths to which the tribe is willing to go to defend its self-ascribed right to engage in tourism-related economic activity within PAP. The tribe's steadfastness indicates that present strategies of using violent force to reduce the "chaos" associated with *mukhālaf* participation in the tourism economy will likely fail to force the *Bidūl* to adopt the agency-constraining positions imposed upon them. Rather, future violence is more likely to jeopardize visitors' confidence that Petra is safe, a development that would damage the economic interests not just of indigenous entrepreneurs and the PDTRA, but of the Hashemite Kingdom as a whole. Instead of forcing the *Bidūl* to comply with dominant visions of limited involvement for the group, the PDTRA should take the lead in fostering a collaborative, participatory policy-making environment in Petra. Such a change would not only address the frozen position in which the tribe's entrepreneurs currently find themselves, but also instill the sense of ownership in development policy needed to sustainably break the current, cyclical pattern of forced positioning, resistance, and violence that characterizes the relationship between the *Bidūl* and the regional authority today.

سياسات القوة ومواقف غير مستقرة: روايات السكان المحليين حول موازين القوة بين القبائل والمنافسة على الاقتصاد السياحي في البتراء الأردنية

نيكولاس ريفز
جامعة باريس للشؤون الدولية، معهد العلوم السياسية، باريس، فرنسا.

عبد الحكيم الحسبان
قسم الأنثروبولوجيا، جامعة اليرموك، إربد، الأردن.

الملخص

شكلت البتراء هدف الجهود التي بذلتها الدولة الأردنية بغية تحويل القطاع السياحي للمملكة الهاشمية إلى المحرك الرئيسي لاقتصاد البلد. تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى البحث عن تأثير تلك الجهود الحكومية التنموية على علاقة القوة بين البدول والليثانة. هاتان الجماعتان العشائريتان تشكلان جزء من مجتمع البتراء الأصلي وقد تغيرت حياتهما وسبل معيشتهما نتيجة لتنامي عدد السياح الذين يزورون المدينة منذ ثمانينيات القرن الماضي.

تطبق هذه الدراسة نظرية التموضع (positioning theory) لتحليل ٥٦ مقابلة شبه منظمة تم إجراؤها مع أبناء البدول والليثانة عبر أربع زيارات ميدانية إلى منطقة البتراء بين أغسطس\آب ٢٠١٨ ويناير\كانون الثاني ٢٠٢٠.

تجد هذه الدراسة أنّ القرار الذي اتخذته الحكومة الأردنية في سنة ١٩٨٤ والذي أدى إلى ترحيل البدول من مغارات البتراء وإعادة توطين القبيلة في قرية أم صيحون ترتبت عليه تداعيات بعيدة المدى فيما يتعلق بموازنة القوة بين البدول والليثانة. في الوقت الحالي، يستغل كل من البدول والليثانة وسلطة إقليم البتراء التنموي السياحي نقل القبيلة إلى أم صيحون في تصريحات تلقي ظلالا من الشك على حق البدول في العمل في الاقتصاد السياحي المحلي كمواطنين متساوين في منطقة البتراء.

الكلمات الدالة: نظرية التموضع؛ القوة؛ السياحة؛ التنمية؛ سياسة الحكومات؛ البتراء

Endnotes

(1) The George Washington University IRB approved this research under application number NCR191132.

(2) In Arabic, the word "*badawī* [Bedouin]" shares the root of "*bādiya* [desert]." The literal meaning of "*badawī*," which is "dweller of the *bādiya*," stems from this relationship. Massad (2001) revealed, however, that "Bedouin" in present-day Jordan has become synonymous with "Transjordanian" or "ethnic East-Banker," regardless of a person's nomadic or urban origins. This transformation in the meaning of "Bedouin" reflected a concerted legal and sociocultural effort by the Jordanian government, under the influence of British colonialists like Colonel John Bagot Glubb, to consolidate nomadic tribes' Bedouin *identities* into a nationwide Bedouin *identity*. This occurred first through legal measures that sedentarized the nomadic tribes that roamed the land that in 1921 became Transjordan and then through the creation of a national, Bedouin-Jordanian identity to differentiate "ethnic Jordanians" from the Palestinian-Jordanian "Other" after Black September.

(3) The *Bidūl* refer to themselves as "the *Bidūl*" and as "the Bedouins." The latter designation serves to clearly distinguish the *Bidūl* from the *Layāthnā*, whom many *Bidūl* refer to derogatorily as "*falāhīn* [farmers]."

References

Akrawi, A. (2012). Forty-Four Years of Management Plans in Petra. In D.C. Comer (Ed.), *Tourism and Archaeological Heritage Management at Petra: Driver to Development or Destruction?* (31–77). Springer.

Al-Mousa, Z. (2016). *Taʾthīr al-Siyāḥa ʿalā Mujtamaʿ al-Bidūl fī al-Batrā [The Effect of Tourism on the Bidūl Community in Petra]* [Unpublished master's thesis]. The Hashemite University.

Anani, J. (1987). Adjustment and Development: The Case of Jordan. In S. El-Naggar (Ed.), *Adjustment Policies and Development Strategies in the Arab World* (pp. 124–148). International Monetary Fund.

Bartlett, T. (2008). Wheels Within Wheels, or Triangles Within Triangles: Time and Context in Positioning Theory. In F. Moghaddam & R. Harré (Eds.), *Global Conflict Resolution Through Positioning Analysis* (pp. 169–188). Springer.

Bille, M. (2019). *Being Bedouin Around Petra: Life at a World Heritage Site in the Twenty-First Century*. Berghahn Books.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. (E. Gellner et al., Eds. ; R. Nice, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published in 1972).

Burkhardt, J.L. (1822). *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land*. John Murray.

Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. (S. Smith, Ed. & Trans.). Tavistock Publications Limited. (Original work published in 1969)

Greiff, T. (2018). *Violent Places: Everyday Politics and Public Lives in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Tectum Wissenschaftsverlag.

Harré, R. & Van Langenhove, L. (1999). Introducing Positioning Theory. In R. Harré & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), *Positioning Theory: Moral Contexts of Intentional Action* (pp. 14–31). Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Jordan Times. (2023, January 2). Petra welcomed 905,000 visitors in 2022 — PDTRA. *The Jordan Times*. https://jordantimes.com/news/local/petra-welcomed-905000-visitors-2022-%E2%80%94-pdtra#:~:text=The%20statistics%20also%20indicated%20a,according%20to%20the%20PDTRA%20statistics.

Knoema. (n.d.). *Jordan – Contribution of travel and tourism to GDP as a share of GDP*. Retrieved March 28, 2021, from https://knoema.com/atlas/Jordan/topics/Tourism/Travel-and-Tourism-Total-Contribution-to-GDP/Contribution-of-travel-and-tourism-to-GDP-percent-of-GDP.

Kraishan, H. (2021, March 23). Baʿd Tawaqquf al-Siyāha.. 80% min Sukān al-Batrā bilā Maṣādir Dakhl [After the Suspension of Tourism: 80% of Petra's Residents have no Source of Income]. *Al Ghad*. https://alghad.com/بعد-توقف-السياحة-80-من-سكان-البترا-بلا-مص/.

Massad, J. (2001). *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*. Columbia University Press.

Mitchell, T. (1991). *Colonising Egypt.* University of California Press.

Mustafa, M.I. (2023, April 2). Petra welcomes 'highest ever' number of tourists in Q1 2023 — PDTRA. *The Jordan Times*. https://jordantimes.com/news/local/petra-welcomes-%E2%80%98highest-ever%E2%80%99-number-tourists-q1-2023-%E2%80%94-pdtra.

Orbasli, A. & Cesaro, G. (2020). Rethinking Management Planning Methodologies: A Novel Approach Implemented at Petra World Heritage Site. *Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites,* 22(1-2), 93–111.

Pappé, I. (1994). Jordan between Hashemite and Palestinian Identity." In J. Nevo and I. Pappé (Eds.), *Jordan in the Middle East: The Making of a Pivotal State, 1948-1988 (pp. 61–94).* Frank Cass & Co. Ltd.

Petra Development & Tourism Region Authority. (n.d.). *Statistics: Petra Visitors Statistics 2000-2016*. https://www.visitpetra.jo/DetailsPage/VisitPetra/ StatisticsDetailsEn.aspx?PID=5.

Reeves, N. (2023, April 19). *Bringing Order to Petra's Tourism Economy*. Tourism Cases, CABI International. https://www.cabidigitallibrary.org/doi/10.1079/tourism.2023.0010.

Reeves, N. (2022a). Bayna al-mādi wal-ḥādir: Ḥikāyāt abnāʾ qabīlatay al-Bidūl wal-Layāthna al-tārīkhiya wa ahmiyatuha al-mustamira fī al-ʿaṣr al-rāhin [Between past and present: The oral histories of the

Bidūl and *Layāthnā* tribes and their ongoing importance today]. *Abhath al-Yarmouk: Humanities and Social Sciences Series* 31(1), 1–23.

Reeves, N. (2022b, September 20). *Jordan: Police operation in Petra produces harsh criticism of regional authority.* Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/police-petra-jordan-tribes-authority.

Reeves, N. (2021, September 28). *Erasing History: Rival tribal narratives, official regime discourse, and the exclusionary debate over indigeneity in Petra, Jordan.* ESIA Dean's Scholars Journal. https://blogs.gwu.edu/esiadeansscholarsjournal/2022/08/01/erasing-history-rival-tribal-narratives-official-regime-discourse-and-the-exclusionary-debate-over-indigeneity-in-petra-jordan/.

Reeves, N. (2020). Shaykhs and tribal entrepreneurs: Tribal hierarchies, governmental development policies, and the struggle over representation in Petra's tourism economy. *Oxford Middle East Review* 4(1).

Russell, K.W. (1993). Ethnohistory of the Bedul Bedouin of Petra. *Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan* 37(1), 15–35.

Shryock, A. (1997). *Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan.* University of California Press.

Tan, S. & Moghaddam, F. (1999). Positioning in Intergroup Relations. In R. Harré & L. Van Langenhove (Eds.), *Positioning Theory: Moral Contexts of Intentional Action* (pp. 178–194). Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Trading Economics. (2021a). *Jordan Tourist Arrivals*. Retrieved March 28, 2021, from https://tradingeconomics.com/jordan/tourist-arrivals.

Urk, K. (2001). Sources of Economic Growth in Jordan. *The Journal of Energy Development* 27(1), 89-100.